More News From The Front Lines
Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of seven Republicans to sign onto the foolish Senate Deal, made a rather interesting statement. Knight-Ridder news services picked this up from the "esteemed" senator from South Carolina.
Sen. Rick Santorum, R-Pa., said that on Supreme Court vacancies, the president should rely on his own counsel. But Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the seven Republicans who signed the agreement, said the president must cooperate with the Senate. "I’m hopeful that we can get a Supreme Court nominee — it may come soon — through a collaborative process who would be a solid conservative," Graham said. "The next test for the body is the potential Supreme Court opening."
I would like to point out to the senator that the collaborative effort he is hoping for is unconstitutional. That is not what Article II, Section 2, Clause two states. It specifically reads as follows:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
"Advice and Consent" from the Senate is not in the selection process. It comes in the confirmation process. In the deal that was signed, this sort of consultation was not demanded. Now, it appears as though Senator Graham has decided that this sort of collaboration should go on. Never mind that "Advice and Consent" comes after the nomination, Senator Graham now wants in on that decision, as well. Alexander Hamilton made it clear in Federalist #76 why the process works the way it does.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have FEWER personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.'' This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.
...They contend that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from the power of NOMINATION, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.'' This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.
In other words, to turn the process of nomination over, even a little to the Senate—who is supposed to be a check in the process, not a participant—would be to place it truly in the hands of partisanship and favor-paying. Whereas it would be the president choosing a person based on their qualifications for a job, we would be reduced to the level the Senate stands at now. We have one party that is blocking nominations, and they do so unconstitutionally each and every time. They have no way to stop the party in power, so they narrowly interpret the laws or the rules to allow them their antics.
And they want the president to trust them with the appointments needing to be made? That is a hoot. Which court would Sen. Graham like Noam Chomsky on?
But Sen. Graham isn’t the only nut with an idea. Sen. Chuck Schumer from New York added this. If you thought Graham’s idea was nauseating, wait until you read this.
So if you want a true compromise that preserves balance between the branches, I offer my proposal:
• Create nominating commissions in every state and circuit.
• Give the President and the opposition party leader in the Senate the power to name equal numbers of members of each commission.
• Instruct each commission to propose one name for each vacancy.
• And, barring the discovery of anything that disqualifies the person for service, both the President and the Senate agree to nominate and confirm him or her.
I am sorry, but did someone let Sen. Schumer’s brain out for a walk? It is obviously not present right now. The entire idea presented by both of these men is preposterous. The Senate should have NO POWER—whatsoever—in the nomination of an appointee. And the president would be wise to have a nice long talk with some of his Senate constituents. These fools are trying to take away a power that the president possesses—properly and explicitly enumerated—within the Constitution. To even entertain this idea is reckless. To consider changing the process through more extra-Constitutional/unconstitutional rules is a road to disaster.
The Bunny ;)
Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of seven Republicans to sign onto the foolish Senate Deal, made a rather interesting statement. Knight-Ridder news services picked this up from the "esteemed" senator from South Carolina.
Sen. Rick Santorum, R-Pa., said that on Supreme Court vacancies, the president should rely on his own counsel. But Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the seven Republicans who signed the agreement, said the president must cooperate with the Senate. "I’m hopeful that we can get a Supreme Court nominee — it may come soon — through a collaborative process who would be a solid conservative," Graham said. "The next test for the body is the potential Supreme Court opening."
I would like to point out to the senator that the collaborative effort he is hoping for is unconstitutional. That is not what Article II, Section 2, Clause two states. It specifically reads as follows:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
"Advice and Consent" from the Senate is not in the selection process. It comes in the confirmation process. In the deal that was signed, this sort of consultation was not demanded. Now, it appears as though Senator Graham has decided that this sort of collaboration should go on. Never mind that "Advice and Consent" comes after the nomination, Senator Graham now wants in on that decision, as well. Alexander Hamilton made it clear in Federalist #76 why the process works the way it does.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have FEWER personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.'' This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.
...They contend that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from the power of NOMINATION, which is proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no difference others, who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.'' This will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.
In other words, to turn the process of nomination over, even a little to the Senate—who is supposed to be a check in the process, not a participant—would be to place it truly in the hands of partisanship and favor-paying. Whereas it would be the president choosing a person based on their qualifications for a job, we would be reduced to the level the Senate stands at now. We have one party that is blocking nominations, and they do so unconstitutionally each and every time. They have no way to stop the party in power, so they narrowly interpret the laws or the rules to allow them their antics.
And they want the president to trust them with the appointments needing to be made? That is a hoot. Which court would Sen. Graham like Noam Chomsky on?
But Sen. Graham isn’t the only nut with an idea. Sen. Chuck Schumer from New York added this. If you thought Graham’s idea was nauseating, wait until you read this.
So if you want a true compromise that preserves balance between the branches, I offer my proposal:
• Create nominating commissions in every state and circuit.
• Give the President and the opposition party leader in the Senate the power to name equal numbers of members of each commission.
• Instruct each commission to propose one name for each vacancy.
• And, barring the discovery of anything that disqualifies the person for service, both the President and the Senate agree to nominate and confirm him or her.
I am sorry, but did someone let Sen. Schumer’s brain out for a walk? It is obviously not present right now. The entire idea presented by both of these men is preposterous. The Senate should have NO POWER—whatsoever—in the nomination of an appointee. And the president would be wise to have a nice long talk with some of his Senate constituents. These fools are trying to take away a power that the president possesses—properly and explicitly enumerated—within the Constitution. To even entertain this idea is reckless. To consider changing the process through more extra-Constitutional/unconstitutional rules is a road to disaster.
The Bunny ;)
posted by Syd And Vaughn | 3:33 PM
4 Comments:
"Bunny",
Now there is wisdom all wrapped up in a single post. The President's power is explicit under the Constitution.
These senators that keep pulling this crap need to go. They just keep mucking up the system with interpretations and ideas that have no fundamental basis at all under the Constitution.
And though I doubt that the president will cave--he is quite strict on what the Constitution says--these senators are going to keep pressing for this.
But, as you aptly pointed out, Hamilton explained why the idiots in the Senate have no power in this realm of the president's power; the idiot savants there would re-run FDR's idea of stacking a court to further their own agendas, rather than the agenda of the commander-in-chief; the duly-elected, chief executive representing America.
We voted for Pres. Bush because we trusted that he would steer this nation wisely, faithfully, and legally for four more years. We agree with his ideas and his agenda.
The Senate, of course, seems to have other ideas in what the president should and shouldn't be allowed to do. And it is positively sickening to watch our elected representatives doing this sort of thing.
Mistress Pundit
Well done. One of the many brilliant innovation of our Constitution is that it defines the three separate branches of our federal government, the legislature, the executive and judicial. It also sets forth the powers and responsibility or duties of each and at the same time provides for how the three branches are to get along or function known as check and balances. There are some in congress who apparently would ignore out constitution and won't accept what it says. Senator Schumer and the freshman Graham is another. If they don't like the way it is written, it also provides how it can be amended. They don't have that power or right. You are correct in explaining the presidents exclusive appointment power and the confirmation of the senate. This is check and balance. Rawriter
Bravo, Sweets,
An excellent post, as always, and well thought out. I was wondering what you meant when you grumbled about Schumer and Graham today. Now I know.
You are quite correct in your assertion regarding the president's power. The Ctr. for Amer. Progress even agrees with the blindlingly obvious fact that the president doesn't need to talk to the Senate when it comes to nominating people.
And you did a good job with Hamilton's points in the Federalist Papers. There is enough partisanship in politics now. Can we imagine what it would be like if we allowed these "old guard" senators in the process to nominate.
I liked that point regarding Noam Chomsky; if the partisan Senate becomes involved, who will really be accepted as a nominee.
Will it be the most qualified person?
Or...will it be someone to annoy or injure the other side of the aisle with?
Our first commenter picked up on the fact that, yes, the president's powers are "explicit", but we knew there were those in the Senate that held true to these beliefs. I expect more to come out and proclaim that these two are correct.
That idea couldn't be further from the truth, and anyone who signs onto the idea is so judicially and legally inept that I want them nowhere near the debate.
Thomas
To Thomas,
Yes, I agree completely. But you are correct in a very important aspect; others will rise to their cause. Count on it. I would expect to hear Sens. Chafee, Snowe, or McCain coming to their side soon.
There are, in my opinion, far too many cheerleaders on either side of the aisle that would prefer to hype up ideas that aren't covered by our laws, our Constitution, or directly violates either or both.
It's time for these people to go. The damage done to this nation, and her founding document is great, but not irrepairable. All that's needed are people to stand up for it again, and back these socialistic asses down.
Mistress Pundit
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