Open Topic Sunday ...
Well, not really. We've been talking about it since Thursday. On Thursday, Michelle Malkin put out the call: We need an Army of Translators and Analysts. And the blogosphere stepped up, saluted, and meant it when we said:
"Reporting for duty!"
We have come through with flying colors, led by Ms. Malkin and a host of others including the blogosphere's best translator in regard to these documents, Omar from Iraq The Model. Last night, we kicked off our coverage right here. And today, we will continue to pull from the A to Z master list of documents providing insight and commentary. None of us speak a Middle Eastern language, so unless we locate a document that has been translated, we can offer no analysis of it.
Also, for those that are truly keeping an eye on this, you should be watching the Pajamas Media page regarding the Iraqi documents. Also, people might want to take note of this piece by Stephen Hayes concerning Saddam's connection to the Phillipines.
Now, maestro, cue the music:
DOCUMENT: DOCEX Saddam 030306
This is a transcript of a meeting with Saddam Hussein and members of his cabinet, apparently. The entire pdf file is 18 pages long. No, I'm not going to cut-and-paste the whoel damn thing, and it seems that there is a problem with the Adobe Acrobat reader as I can't even snip pieces for you. In general, the oening couple of pages deal with biological weapons, and Rolf Ekeus. Ekeus was the UN's director for their "Special Commission on Iraq" from '91-'97. The talk focuses on whether or not they can continue to hide their biological agents from Ekeus, and whether he has enough found to stand on before the Security Council.
Tariq Aziz is at this meeting, and presents a scenario to Hussein; one in which Ekeus detailed nothing regarding their biological weapons. Aziz talks about as "big gap" concerning Ekeus' investigation into their biological program, and that certain members of the UN Security Council would consider the matter moot as long as "that big gap" remains. Should it be filled, further questions will be brought to bear on not only Ekeus, which would prompt deeper investigations, but also on Iraq to account for the "new information" regarding the aforementioned "gap."
Now, let me stop right here, and give some insight. Obviously, back during Ekeus' time in the UN, he was assembling a file on Iraq, and part of that file contained information regarding their bilogical weapons. But, there were gaps in the information, and to some--like Tariq Aziz--the gaps were big enough to drive a Mack truck through. As long as they remained, the UNSC would simply shrug it's shoulders and say "oh well." If Ekeus had found new information, the UNSC would start asking him to probe deeper, which would have put the Hussein regime on the defensive.
Moving on, Aziz starts to talk about their missiles, and the fact that in July of 1993, Ekeus and his team returned to Iraq to look for illegal missiles. Aziz makes it a point to state that the information in Ekeus' hands is that from the Pentagon. He states that they were allowed entry to places that they demanded to see, and they found nothing. The same applies to their biological program, where the sites of Al-Hakam and Al-Salman were swabbed and inspected, and Ekeus found nothing.
Aziz goes on to state that this commission that Ekeus was heading up was pushed by the Germans, who seem to be raising the most attention regarding the information in Ekeus' report, but then he goes on to state that as yet, nothing has been found. He explains that the French and the Russians will see nothing new, but America will "nitpick" details. The special commission's job is to assure the world that Iraq has complied with the 1991 cease-fire agreement, and that they pose no threat through banned weapons to the region. It is pointed out, though, that France stated there was no way to reach that "100%" compliance; a fact that Hussein--based on this transcript--is fully exploiting.
Aziz goes on to point out to Saddam that only America and Great Britain are making a fuss over the special commission's work. He states to Saddam point blank that if he sat down with the French foreign minister, Saddam would "find him convinced that Iraq no longer has anything" to obstruct it in relation to Paragraph 22 (regarding the cease-fire, I'm guessing; it is not stated in clear context.) Another man, al-Sahhaf, states that when they used to speak with members of the UN, they listened. Now, they have America and Great Britian in their ears, na dit makes things difficult. He cites a meeting that was convened between a general and members of the UNSC where they told the general they were "not convinced" that Iraq had complied.
A Lt. Gen. Husayn is next, and he begins talking about the biological file of Ekeus, but diverts to chemical weapons. Where the UN does have their records, they do not have all of them, and the regime hasn't been forthcoming regarding their use, their distribution, and the actual amounts they had. In short, they lied and covered up their chemcal components. He also states that Iraq wasn't pressured, because there was no serious pressure from the UNSC, they didn't reveal all their bilogical capabilities. And in reference to those materials, the stated amount is 17 tons. He states that they have the inventiories from Europe and the United States, but the allusion made is that the 17 tons is the known quantities; there is obviously more that is unaccounted for.
There is a particularly peculiar statement made right after this by Husayn. "Therefore, Sir, if someone wants to create a problem, we have to be careful to find out: Does he want to make peace or create a new relationship quietly. No, Sir, I differ here." The reason I call this peculiar is that the "he" in question isn't identified. This was during the nineties. Was it Clinton they were referring to, in recognition--albeit, passing--of his conciliatory remarks regarding Iraq, or is it Ekeus. Or, is it someone entirely different; a UNSC member, perhaps? And what sort of "relationship" would this be exactly?
When Husayn brings up the nuclear issue, he is adamant to point out that they haven't been forthcoming; that is, the Ekeus team is unaware of some aspects of their program, which could prove to be a problem if discovered. However, he is quick to point out that the UN is unaware of every facility, every scientist, and every step made in this program. He states that "Everything is over." Now, this is strange to state this because by his earlier statement, obviously their program isn't shut down, or it is shut down temporarily.
He jumps back to the biological issue stating that the 17 tons is not the problem, but the "thousands of tons here and thousands of tons there and where did they go, how were they produced, and how were they used." seems to present an alarming problem for the regime. In other words, what is known isn't the predicament. The unaccounted for tons are. And while he downplays Ekeus (the regime obviously thinks the man is a dolt, and inept), he is quick to point out that the French are "tricky, really tricky."
He adds that when the question of biological weapons comes up, they can claim the 17 known tons were used, putting the issue to rest, and safeguarding their stockpiles; ensuring a restart of production when this apparent round of inspections is over. He also goes on to state that France is getting nervous. The contractors they have deals with are getting very nervous, and had severed ties to them at one point. This prompted them to go to the contractors directly, who were reluctant to get involved with Iraq again.
Then, he brings up china, lumping them in the same category as France and Russia; not too far along on the issues at hand. He states that China seems to produce a different face as issues arise, "sometimes yes and sometimes no", and that China is not one to be trusted, right along with the French. (So, I guess Saddam's guys weren't too stupid.)
He moves back to Ekeus and warns that the file on their biological weapons won't be closed quickly; certainly not within a year. And Ekeus will ask them questions regarding the 17 tons of known components. What did they make. When fif they make them? Were they attached to certain missiles? He states that if Ekeus, despite his weakness (garnered from earlier int he transcript), wanted to really push them, they could be in a tricky position. He could exert as much power as needed, and force the Iraqis into a position with little or no exits.
Saddam then calls on Taha Ramadan. Ramadan begins talking about a way to make amends with the Security Council, though he is quick to blow off America and Britain quickly. "I wash my hands of" them, he states. It is clear at this point that Iraq has decided it will never be on good terms with either nation, again. It is not feasible to pursue any sort of measures to pursuade either nation on the council. He says that all four files--nuclear, biological, chemical, and missiles--closed and finished. Ekeus will lay it all out for the UNSC to see. but, he reminds everyone that what is there will not unite the council to act. It is minute, and barely worth their attention.
Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri is next to speak after a break in the recording. And he is speaking about the relations with other nations on the Security Council. the fact that many of them stand with Iraq as it is, and mostly due to business ventures and their own anti-US sentiments. He tells those present that while they are dealing with their friends, he is not sure the extent they would be willing to go to keep those business interests and diplomatic interests alive. In other words, would they be willing to go against the US over something like the (at-the-time) current embargo against Iraq? He suggests as high a level meeting with thos UN dignataries as possible, and tell them that they doubt the US will ever lift the embargo because they want "Iraq's head." It's manipulation at it's best in making the US look like the aggressor rather than the enforcer of cease-fire terms. And in this, he recommends telling those dignataries how far America helped them on these programs; another effort to paint the US in a bad light.
He continues by stating that what will happen will happen, regardless of the steps taken by the Security Council, or the US. If the US puts enough pressure ont he Security Council, it will get it's way; the inevitable return to full hostilities guaranteed. He states that many nations on the Security Council were "trembling" at America, and the evidence they have provided. He senses that if push came to shove, America could get another resolution, possibly further sanctions (alluded to, but not stated), or worse another invasion. He urges everyone to get as many nations on their side as possible. The embargo, mentioned in passing throughout the transcript, would be lifted within a month should everything pan out at the UN.
Mizban Khadr Hadi is next and he is discussing the Security Council resolutions, and when certain things, such as the embargo, might be lifted. He makes a case for turning the tables on America, and forcing it into a position where they would have to rebel against the Security Council resolutions. In the end, after more manipulation of the Security Council members, they would show that they were trying to comply, but the rules were changed on them by America. He also brings up the fact that they can use the plight of the people to influence the council, showing the harshness of the embargo and sanctions. He says that at this time it makes the most sense as the people have the ability to stand and fight.
A man named Muhammed is next, and he isn't identified any further than that. He, too, brings up the suffering of the people. He states that they can't keep perpetuating the situation which brings that suffering to the people through the Security Council resolutions, nor can they irritate Ekeus. (I note that there are different impressions of this man from the people assembled. Some see him as inept. Others see him as a serious thorn in their side.) He notes that the Seucirty Council backs up Ekeus, and he has their full confidence. To upset him now could provoke further suffering of the nation and it's people. He further insists that new inroads be made with the Arab countries. He purposefully excludes Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but not Iran. Iran is not sitting on that list of countries that they shouldn't be talking with. That's interesting in and of itself.
General Husayn (not identified if it is the same Husayn as before) finishes the meeting with a quick overview of their steps so far, including the destruction of certain facilities and machines that allow them to build the missiles they were banned from building and controlling. There is an issue of a Chinese radar system that they have, but Husayn quickly points out that it was for detection, and nothing else yet it was linked to their missile program was subsequently dismantled.
This entire transcript was a winding, twisting road that never seemed to get down to any points save a couple. First, all of his ministers assured him that they had complied with his orders, revealed what was to be revealed to the UNSC and Ekeus' inspectors. They had also complied with the demands fro the destruction of requested facilities. This is a point that mroe than a few moonbats will latch onto. But, the reamining point is that they weren't forthcoming, They had been hiding materials, components, and scientists involved in these programs for the potential restart of these programs as soon as the embargo is lifted. So, yes, they complied, but not as they should have. They were still working on their WMD programs, while trying to find a way around the UNSC; either by manipulation, or faux-capitulation.
Publius II
Well, not really. We've been talking about it since Thursday. On Thursday, Michelle Malkin put out the call: We need an Army of Translators and Analysts. And the blogosphere stepped up, saluted, and meant it when we said:
"Reporting for duty!"
We have come through with flying colors, led by Ms. Malkin and a host of others including the blogosphere's best translator in regard to these documents, Omar from Iraq The Model. Last night, we kicked off our coverage right here. And today, we will continue to pull from the A to Z master list of documents providing insight and commentary. None of us speak a Middle Eastern language, so unless we locate a document that has been translated, we can offer no analysis of it.
Also, for those that are truly keeping an eye on this, you should be watching the Pajamas Media page regarding the Iraqi documents. Also, people might want to take note of this piece by Stephen Hayes concerning Saddam's connection to the Phillipines.
Now, maestro, cue the music:
DOCUMENT: DOCEX Saddam 030306
This is a transcript of a meeting with Saddam Hussein and members of his cabinet, apparently. The entire pdf file is 18 pages long. No, I'm not going to cut-and-paste the whoel damn thing, and it seems that there is a problem with the Adobe Acrobat reader as I can't even snip pieces for you. In general, the oening couple of pages deal with biological weapons, and Rolf Ekeus. Ekeus was the UN's director for their "Special Commission on Iraq" from '91-'97. The talk focuses on whether or not they can continue to hide their biological agents from Ekeus, and whether he has enough found to stand on before the Security Council.
Tariq Aziz is at this meeting, and presents a scenario to Hussein; one in which Ekeus detailed nothing regarding their biological weapons. Aziz talks about as "big gap" concerning Ekeus' investigation into their biological program, and that certain members of the UN Security Council would consider the matter moot as long as "that big gap" remains. Should it be filled, further questions will be brought to bear on not only Ekeus, which would prompt deeper investigations, but also on Iraq to account for the "new information" regarding the aforementioned "gap."
Now, let me stop right here, and give some insight. Obviously, back during Ekeus' time in the UN, he was assembling a file on Iraq, and part of that file contained information regarding their bilogical weapons. But, there were gaps in the information, and to some--like Tariq Aziz--the gaps were big enough to drive a Mack truck through. As long as they remained, the UNSC would simply shrug it's shoulders and say "oh well." If Ekeus had found new information, the UNSC would start asking him to probe deeper, which would have put the Hussein regime on the defensive.
Moving on, Aziz starts to talk about their missiles, and the fact that in July of 1993, Ekeus and his team returned to Iraq to look for illegal missiles. Aziz makes it a point to state that the information in Ekeus' hands is that from the Pentagon. He states that they were allowed entry to places that they demanded to see, and they found nothing. The same applies to their biological program, where the sites of Al-Hakam and Al-Salman were swabbed and inspected, and Ekeus found nothing.
Aziz goes on to state that this commission that Ekeus was heading up was pushed by the Germans, who seem to be raising the most attention regarding the information in Ekeus' report, but then he goes on to state that as yet, nothing has been found. He explains that the French and the Russians will see nothing new, but America will "nitpick" details. The special commission's job is to assure the world that Iraq has complied with the 1991 cease-fire agreement, and that they pose no threat through banned weapons to the region. It is pointed out, though, that France stated there was no way to reach that "100%" compliance; a fact that Hussein--based on this transcript--is fully exploiting.
Aziz goes on to point out to Saddam that only America and Great Britain are making a fuss over the special commission's work. He states to Saddam point blank that if he sat down with the French foreign minister, Saddam would "find him convinced that Iraq no longer has anything" to obstruct it in relation to Paragraph 22 (regarding the cease-fire, I'm guessing; it is not stated in clear context.) Another man, al-Sahhaf, states that when they used to speak with members of the UN, they listened. Now, they have America and Great Britian in their ears, na dit makes things difficult. He cites a meeting that was convened between a general and members of the UNSC where they told the general they were "not convinced" that Iraq had complied.
A Lt. Gen. Husayn is next, and he begins talking about the biological file of Ekeus, but diverts to chemical weapons. Where the UN does have their records, they do not have all of them, and the regime hasn't been forthcoming regarding their use, their distribution, and the actual amounts they had. In short, they lied and covered up their chemcal components. He also states that Iraq wasn't pressured, because there was no serious pressure from the UNSC, they didn't reveal all their bilogical capabilities. And in reference to those materials, the stated amount is 17 tons. He states that they have the inventiories from Europe and the United States, but the allusion made is that the 17 tons is the known quantities; there is obviously more that is unaccounted for.
There is a particularly peculiar statement made right after this by Husayn. "Therefore, Sir, if someone wants to create a problem, we have to be careful to find out: Does he want to make peace or create a new relationship quietly. No, Sir, I differ here." The reason I call this peculiar is that the "he" in question isn't identified. This was during the nineties. Was it Clinton they were referring to, in recognition--albeit, passing--of his conciliatory remarks regarding Iraq, or is it Ekeus. Or, is it someone entirely different; a UNSC member, perhaps? And what sort of "relationship" would this be exactly?
When Husayn brings up the nuclear issue, he is adamant to point out that they haven't been forthcoming; that is, the Ekeus team is unaware of some aspects of their program, which could prove to be a problem if discovered. However, he is quick to point out that the UN is unaware of every facility, every scientist, and every step made in this program. He states that "Everything is over." Now, this is strange to state this because by his earlier statement, obviously their program isn't shut down, or it is shut down temporarily.
He jumps back to the biological issue stating that the 17 tons is not the problem, but the "thousands of tons here and thousands of tons there and where did they go, how were they produced, and how were they used." seems to present an alarming problem for the regime. In other words, what is known isn't the predicament. The unaccounted for tons are. And while he downplays Ekeus (the regime obviously thinks the man is a dolt, and inept), he is quick to point out that the French are "tricky, really tricky."
He adds that when the question of biological weapons comes up, they can claim the 17 known tons were used, putting the issue to rest, and safeguarding their stockpiles; ensuring a restart of production when this apparent round of inspections is over. He also goes on to state that France is getting nervous. The contractors they have deals with are getting very nervous, and had severed ties to them at one point. This prompted them to go to the contractors directly, who were reluctant to get involved with Iraq again.
Then, he brings up china, lumping them in the same category as France and Russia; not too far along on the issues at hand. He states that China seems to produce a different face as issues arise, "sometimes yes and sometimes no", and that China is not one to be trusted, right along with the French. (So, I guess Saddam's guys weren't too stupid.)
He moves back to Ekeus and warns that the file on their biological weapons won't be closed quickly; certainly not within a year. And Ekeus will ask them questions regarding the 17 tons of known components. What did they make. When fif they make them? Were they attached to certain missiles? He states that if Ekeus, despite his weakness (garnered from earlier int he transcript), wanted to really push them, they could be in a tricky position. He could exert as much power as needed, and force the Iraqis into a position with little or no exits.
Saddam then calls on Taha Ramadan. Ramadan begins talking about a way to make amends with the Security Council, though he is quick to blow off America and Britain quickly. "I wash my hands of" them, he states. It is clear at this point that Iraq has decided it will never be on good terms with either nation, again. It is not feasible to pursue any sort of measures to pursuade either nation on the council. He says that all four files--nuclear, biological, chemical, and missiles--closed and finished. Ekeus will lay it all out for the UNSC to see. but, he reminds everyone that what is there will not unite the council to act. It is minute, and barely worth their attention.
Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri is next to speak after a break in the recording. And he is speaking about the relations with other nations on the Security Council. the fact that many of them stand with Iraq as it is, and mostly due to business ventures and their own anti-US sentiments. He tells those present that while they are dealing with their friends, he is not sure the extent they would be willing to go to keep those business interests and diplomatic interests alive. In other words, would they be willing to go against the US over something like the (at-the-time) current embargo against Iraq? He suggests as high a level meeting with thos UN dignataries as possible, and tell them that they doubt the US will ever lift the embargo because they want "Iraq's head." It's manipulation at it's best in making the US look like the aggressor rather than the enforcer of cease-fire terms. And in this, he recommends telling those dignataries how far America helped them on these programs; another effort to paint the US in a bad light.
He continues by stating that what will happen will happen, regardless of the steps taken by the Security Council, or the US. If the US puts enough pressure ont he Security Council, it will get it's way; the inevitable return to full hostilities guaranteed. He states that many nations on the Security Council were "trembling" at America, and the evidence they have provided. He senses that if push came to shove, America could get another resolution, possibly further sanctions (alluded to, but not stated), or worse another invasion. He urges everyone to get as many nations on their side as possible. The embargo, mentioned in passing throughout the transcript, would be lifted within a month should everything pan out at the UN.
Mizban Khadr Hadi is next and he is discussing the Security Council resolutions, and when certain things, such as the embargo, might be lifted. He makes a case for turning the tables on America, and forcing it into a position where they would have to rebel against the Security Council resolutions. In the end, after more manipulation of the Security Council members, they would show that they were trying to comply, but the rules were changed on them by America. He also brings up the fact that they can use the plight of the people to influence the council, showing the harshness of the embargo and sanctions. He says that at this time it makes the most sense as the people have the ability to stand and fight.
A man named Muhammed is next, and he isn't identified any further than that. He, too, brings up the suffering of the people. He states that they can't keep perpetuating the situation which brings that suffering to the people through the Security Council resolutions, nor can they irritate Ekeus. (I note that there are different impressions of this man from the people assembled. Some see him as inept. Others see him as a serious thorn in their side.) He notes that the Seucirty Council backs up Ekeus, and he has their full confidence. To upset him now could provoke further suffering of the nation and it's people. He further insists that new inroads be made with the Arab countries. He purposefully excludes Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but not Iran. Iran is not sitting on that list of countries that they shouldn't be talking with. That's interesting in and of itself.
General Husayn (not identified if it is the same Husayn as before) finishes the meeting with a quick overview of their steps so far, including the destruction of certain facilities and machines that allow them to build the missiles they were banned from building and controlling. There is an issue of a Chinese radar system that they have, but Husayn quickly points out that it was for detection, and nothing else yet it was linked to their missile program was subsequently dismantled.
This entire transcript was a winding, twisting road that never seemed to get down to any points save a couple. First, all of his ministers assured him that they had complied with his orders, revealed what was to be revealed to the UNSC and Ekeus' inspectors. They had also complied with the demands fro the destruction of requested facilities. This is a point that mroe than a few moonbats will latch onto. But, the reamining point is that they weren't forthcoming, They had been hiding materials, components, and scientists involved in these programs for the potential restart of these programs as soon as the embargo is lifted. So, yes, they complied, but not as they should have. They were still working on their WMD programs, while trying to find a way around the UNSC; either by manipulation, or faux-capitulation.
Publius II
posted by Syd And Vaughn | 12:59 AM
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